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of practice, where a field is a bounded domain 
such as agriculture, politics, recreation, or educa-
tion. Practices in a field pursue the specific matters 
at stake in it, drawing on material, symbolic, and 
cultural capitals accumulated there and arising from 
subconscious generating mechanisms (habitus) that, 
in mirroring objective properties of that field, ensure 
that practices perpetuate those properties. Giddens, 
meanwhile, analyzed a slew of prominent social 
phenomena, including institutions, change, systems, 
power, and ideology, by reference to practices, which 
he understood as structured by sets of rules and 
resources. 
 Philosophers, too, have advocated the constitutive 
and causal centrality of social practices. Examples 
are Charles Taylor’s doctrine that social reality  is 
practices and Theodore Schatzki’s claim that social 
phenomena are slices or aspects of nexuses of prac-
tices and material arrangements. 
 Human Activity 
 Theorists of social practices also usually sport a 
particular philosophical conception of human 
activity. Since the 17th century, philosophical dis-
cussions of human activity have been structured 
by the dichotomy between subject and object. On 
the background of the ideas of the celebrated 20th-
century philosophers Martin Heidegger and Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, philosophers of a practice persuasion, 
such as Taylor and Hubert Dreyfus, have made two 
important claims. The first is that action rests on 
something nonpropositional, something that cannot 
be put into words, for example, skills or practical 
understanding. This nonpropositional know-how is 
embodied, as opposed to contained, in a subject or 
its mind. The second claim is that activity so under-
stood both is conceptually prior to and underlies the 
traditional division between mind and the world. 
This claim fosters the philosophically important 
conception of practices as constellations of doings 
and the nonpropositional understandings underly-
ing them, which form the background on which—
the place where—states of mind, human activities, 
rules, and interpersonal relations receive determi-
nate content—that is, are the states, activities, rules, 
and relations they are. 
 This picture of action also characterizes social-
theoretical practice theories, paradigmatically, 
those of Bourdieu and Giddens. In Bourdieu, the 
nonpropositional phenomenon that underlies action 
is habitus: arrays of subconscious bodily struc-
tures that generate activity, thought, and percep-
tion. Meanwhile, according to Giddens, “practical 
consciousness”—what a person knows but cannot 
say—is the central agency responsible for human 
activity. 
 Theories highlighting practices share the convic-
tion that prominent features of human or social life 
not previously so conceived are best understood as 
constituted or rooted in bundles of actions resting 
on embodied know-how. As the above discussion 
shows, the concept of social practices also joins 
philosophy and social theory. Practically all theo-
ries that make the concept central are resolutely 
multidisciplinary. 
 Theodore R. Schatzki 
 See also  Embodied Cognition; Habitus; Holism, in the 
Social Sciences; Individualism, Methodological; 
Knowing-How Versus Knowing-That; Pragmatism 
and the Social Sciences 
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 SOCIAL RULES 
 Social rules are the rules of social groups. Different 
groups may have different rules. A possible social 
rule is the rule that one is not to talk on a cell phone 
while dining with friends. Although such rules are 
commonplace, theorists disagree on what precisely 
they amount to. There is pointed disagreement over 
the attitudes individual members of a social group 
must have if there is to be a social rule. One account 
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argues that there is a social rule when members  per-
sonally  accept a certain pattern of action as a stan-
dard for the group. Another account argues that 
 joint  acceptance by the members is required. The 
joint account claims to explain better how people 
respond to rule breakers. 
 This entry briefly reviews three prominent 
accounts of social rules and highlights their 
differences. 
 H. L. A. Hart on Social Rules 
 According to the British legal philosopher H. L. A. 
Hart, there is a social rule within a group if and 
only if, roughly, all or most group members (a) regu-
larly conform to a particular pattern of behavior; 
(b) consider this pattern a standard to which group 
members  ought  to conform, all else being equal; (c) 
pressure one another to conform to the rule; and (d) 
think that such pressure is justified. Though influen-
tial, Hart’s account is open to criticism. The neces-
sity of each of his conditions has been questioned. 
Furthermore, it seems that there are situations that 
meet all of his conditions but do not instantiate the 
concept of a social rule. 
 Thus, consider the following case: All mem-
bers of a particular group are regularly truthful, 
they consider  not lying to be a standard to which 
group members ought to conform, they pressure 
one another not to lie, and they believe that such 
pressure is justified. As described, not lying seems to 
meet all of Hart’s conditions for a social rule of this 
group. But though each group member  individually 
considers not lying to be a standard to which group 
members ought to conform, it is not clear that it is a 
rule  of the group. 
 It has also been argued against Hart’s account 
that the kind of pressure put upon rule breakers, 
including demands for conformity and rebukes 
for nonconformity, requires a special standing or 
authority. Hart’s conditions could be satisfied with-
out group members having that authority. 
 David Lewis on Social Convention 
 Some see  social conventions as a species of social 
rule. According to David Lewis, conventions are 
patterns of behavior conformed to by members of 
a given group within a recurring  coordination prob-
lem. Here is a sample coordination problem: Sue 
and Tom agree to meet at “the Greek restaurant 
downtown.” Later, both realize that there are two 
Greek restaurants downtown. They have no way to 
contact one another. Tom and Sue have a coordina-
tion problem. Each wants to go to the same restau-
rant as the other, and neither cares which restaurant 
that is, but where should each one go? 
 According to Lewis, a group has a convention if 
and only if, roughly, there is a pattern of behavior 
in the context of a particular coordination problem 
such that all or most members of the group conform 
to that pattern, expect one another to conform to 
it, and prefer to conform to it on condition that the 
others do, and all of this is known to all. 
 A clear case of a Lewisian convention is driving on 
the right side of the road. When all relevant persons 
prefer to drive on the side everyone else drives on, 
everyone expects everyone else to drive on the right, 
everyone does so drive, and all this is known to all. 
 Driving on the right may have become the con-
vention by chance. Perhaps some people started driv-
ing on the right for no particular reason and others 
took it from there. Lewis emphasizes that there need 
be no explicit agreement in order to start a conven-
tion, nor need the parties be moved by a sense of 
their obligations to others. Group members conform 
to conventions given their personal preferences and 
their personal expectations that others will conform. 
 Does Lewis’s account of convention capture our 
everyday understanding of social rules? One prob-
lem with the account is that not all social rules seem 
to be grounded in coordination problems. The cell 
phone rule imagined earlier seems to be an example. 
It may simply make sense to some people to have 
such a rule. If that is right, Lewis’s account is in at 
least one respect too narrow to account for social 
rules generally. 
 Another problem is that Lewis’s account seems 
unable to explain important aspects of social rules. 
People think of the rules of their group as some-
thing that members should conform to regardless of 
personal preference. Furthermore, Lewis’s account 
seems not to entail that group members have the 
standing to rebuke one another for failing to con-
form to an established convention. 
 Margaret Gilbert on Social Rules 
 Margaret Gilbert’s account of social rules differs from 
those of both Hart and Lewis in significant ways. 
It does not appeal to what individuals personally 
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accept, expect, or prefer from others. It invokes the 
 joint acceptance of a rule and explains this in terms 
of something akin to an agreement. 
 If two individuals make an agreement, then if 
one violates the agreement without release from 
the other, that other has grounds for rebuking the 
violator. In other terms, agreements create obliga-
tions of the parties, one to another. When there is a 
social rule in Gilbert’s sense, the parties are in this 
way obligated to conform to certain standards of 
behavior. 
 Gilbert’s account of social rules is not in terms of 
agreements as such but rather in terms of something 
she takes to be the result of agreement making. It 
can also occur independently of the making of an 
agreement strictly speaking. This is what she refers 
to as  joint commitment. 
 According to Gilbert’s account, in her technical 
terminology, a given pattern of behavior is the rule 
of a particular group if and only if members  jointly 
commit themselves to accept as a body that they 
are to conform to it. Those who make such a joint 
commitment are said  jointly to accept that they are 
to conform to the said pattern. As a result of this 
process, each member of the group is committed to 
conform to the rule in question, and no one is in a 
position unilaterally to rid oneself of this commit-
ment; the permission of the other group members is 
required. Furthermore, Gilbert argues, each mem-
ber is in a position to rebuke other members for 
nonconformity to the group’s rule and to demand 
conformity when it is threatened. Thus, she sees her 
account as an improvement over that of both Hart 
and Lewis in this respect. 
 Margaret Gilbert and Maura Priest 
 See also  Collective Agents; Commitment; Conventions, 
Logic of; Plural Subjects; Promises and Agreements; 
Rule Following; Social Conventions; Social Facts; 
Social Norms 
 Further Readings 
 Dworkin, R. (1977).  Taking rights seriously. London, 
England: Duckworth. 
 Gilbert, M. (1999). Social rules: Some problems for Hart’s 
account, and an alternative proposal. Law and 
Philosophy, 18, 141–171. 
 Gilbert, M. (2008). Social convention revisited.  Topoi, 27, 
5–16. 
 Hart, H. L. A. (1961).  The concept of law. Oxford, 
England: Clarendon. 
 Lewis, D. K. (1969).  Convention. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
 SOCIAL STUDIES OF SCIENCE 
AND TECHNOLOGY 
 Social studies of science and technology is a field of 
scholarship that has developed in its current form 
only in the past 40 years or so; it is often referred 
to as STS, for science and technology studies. In its 
broadest sense, STS is concerned with the concep-
tual and empirical analysis of science and technol-
ogy in their social context. 
 Orthodox philosophy of science and STS are 
clear contenders with regard to the study of science, 
and to a large extent, STS has challenged received 
assumptions about science and technology. Equally, 
STS can be seen as important for the development 
of the philosophy of the social sciences, as certain 
social-scientific disciplines, notably sociology, have 
been expanding their erstwhile domain by looking 
at science, the role of scientific theories, and scien-
tific production, while at the same time positing 
interesting philosophical questions about science 
and the way it should be studied. In this vein, the 
reader may also look at a parallel development, the 
study of the economics of scientific knowledge (see 
entry in this encyclopedia), as an offshoot of modern 
developments in the philosophy of science and of 
social science. 
 Though there are many reasons for being inter-
ested in the social context of science and technology, 
there are three analytical issues that are most promi-
nent and of conceptual importance for philosophy 
and the social sciences. 
 (1) The first of these revolves around the question 
of the extent to which science and technology—but 
especially science—are bound up with or indepen-
dent of their societal context. As will be explained 
below, this issue was the central point of contention 
in early scholarly debates around STS in the 1970s 
and into the 1980s. (2) The second analytical issue 
relates to the growing importance of science and 
technology for the social and human sciences, given 
the extent to which contemporary political and 
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